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Abstract: Standing on the cusp of a global transition from a 
Western-dominated world to one experiencing the effects of the 
“economic renaissance of East Asia,” as Giovanni Arrighi calls it, 
Ngũgĩ’s wa Thiong’o’s 2006 novel Wizard of the Crow reiterates 
the author’s well-known critique of neocolonialism but also, per-
haps more importantly, registers the growing presence of Asia in 
Africa and offers a thought-provoking consideration of the mean-
ing of that presence in an era of global capital. Though commonly 
identified as a “dictator novel,” Wizard is only partly about “The 
Ruler” of the fictional African nation of Aburĩria. Through the 
titular character, Ngũgĩ develops a narrative that explores the op-
portunities and dangers of embracing the paths of modernization 
marked out by the advancing economic powers of East Asia. This 
paper analyzes that narrative, focusing in particular on the the-
matic and formal elements that reflect and are relevant to China’s 
all-important ambitions in Africa and its core policy of offering 
aid “without political conditions.” These issues ultimately involve 
the novel in contemporary debates specific to the China-in-Africa 
phenomenon.
Keywords: China-Africa relations, Wizard of the Crow, Ngũgĩ wa 
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is the first and clearest sign that such an empowerment has 
begun.
Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing (2007)
We . . . offer our assistance [to Africa] with the deepest sincerity 
and without any political conditions.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (2003)
We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to 
the west, where the sun sets.
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (2005)
Introduction
In an early chapter of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s novel Wizard of the Crow 
(2006), the central antagonist—the “Ruler” of the Free Republic of 
Aburĩria, the fictionalized Kenya where the novel is set—speaks to a 
group of Aburĩrian citizens during a public ceremony at which his syco-
phantic ministers have presented him with a gift. As a show of thanks, 
the Ruler announces that he has freed hundreds of political prisoners, 
many of whom were imprisoned precisely so they could be released to 
demonstrate the Ruler’s magnanimous and forgiving nature. To further 
prove his capacity to pardon, the Ruler invites Dr. Yunice Immaculate 
Mgenzi to join him on the stage. Yunice, the Ruler explains, was a 
revolutionary during the Cold War. She was a “Maoist. Alikuwa mtu 
ya Beijing”—a person of Beijing, or one of Beijing’s people (21). The 
Ruler, in contrast, despite his characteristic megalomania and self-ag-
grandizing identification with/as the nation, is mtu ya West. The Ruler 
rose to power through an early “alliance with the colonial state and the 
white forces behind it” (233) and, as the anonymous narrator of Wizard 
observes, “the armed forces and the West” are the “two main pillars” 
upon which his rule is built (645). The Ruler is able to forgive Yunice 
because she has not only overcome her Maoism but has also become one 
of the Ruler’s devotees and, therefore, one of the West’s. Having turned 
from East to West, Yunice is appointed Aburĩria’s first female Deputy 
Ambassador to the United States, and later becomes the Ambassador. 
This kind of dependency upon and obsession with the West is one of the 
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central critiques that Ngũgĩ ’s satirical novel levels at African dictators. 
Indeed, as Jeff Turrentine writes in his 2006 New York Times review, the 
novel parodies and denounces the “neocolonial system in which today’s 
lending banks and multinationals have supplanted yesterday’s European 
overlords” throughout Africa. In the novel, Ngũgĩ cleverly coins the 
term “corpolonialism” (corporate-colonialism) to describe and parody 
contemporary forms of colonial control that function through hegem-
onic networks of global capitalism, which he sees as primarily originat-
ing in and functioning from the West.
In all of his exaggerated egotism, the Ruler is a patchwork of several 
post-independence African dictators: Idi Amin, Sani Abacha, Daniel 
Arap Moi, Omar al-Bashir, and Robert Mugabe. However, the Ruler is 
out of synch with at least one of these dictators in a key respect. While 
the Ruler turns West, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Zimbabwe’s 
independence in 2005, Mugabe, perhaps the most infamous African 
dictator living today, asserted, “We have turned east, where the sun rises, 
and given our back to the west, where the sun sets” (qtd. in Meldrum). 
Mugabe was speaking of Zimbabwe’s emerging relationship with China 
after Western powers had, from his perspective, mistreated and aban-
doned Zimbabwe in a time of great economic need. The US and other 
Western entities are known for offering aid and investments only on 
certain conditions—namely, that African leaders respect human rights, 
end corruption, and promote democracy and free trade. These are os-
tensibly positive aims, of course, but for many in Africa such conditions 
are evidence of the power-mongering tendencies of the West. In con-
trast, China’s business in Africa claims to be purely business. As Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao declared, “We . . . offer our assistance [to Africa] 
with the deepest sincerity and without any political conditions” (qtd. in 
Alden 15). Whereas Ngũgĩ ’s novel places the Ruler’s neocolonial adora-
tion of the West in opposition to a Maoist ideology of the revolutionary 
past, in reality not only Mugabe but many African dictators and politi-
cal leaders have eagerly and wholeheartedly become watu wa Beijing. 
In fact, two months after Turrentine’s review of Ngũgĩ ’s novel, the New 
York Times ran an article about another seminal event in contemporary 
African affairs, although this one was in progress and took place farther 
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east: the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), during which the Chinese government welcomed politi-
cal leaders, including forty heads of state, from forty-eight of the then 
fifty-three African states, for the official purposes of expanding trade, 
securing energy resources (particularly oil), and offering aid to Africa’s 
struggling economies. “The unofficial purpose,” writes reporter Joseph 
Kahn, was “to redraw the world’s strategic map, forming tighter political 
ties between China, now the fastest-growing major economy, and a con-
tinent whose leaders often complain of being neglected by the United 
States and Europe.” 
If the world’s strategic map was indeed redrawn not simply by the 
2006 Forum but by China’s unprecedented advances into Africa leading 
up to the Forum,1 and if African leaders have increasingly turned East 
and embraced Chinese aid, investments, and multinational corporations 
(MNCs), why does Ngũgĩ ’s dictator reject Beijing and continue to court 
the West? One answer is that critical perspectives on the West and neo-
colonialism are still necessary and relevant because the West has hardly 
ceased to be a dominant player in African political and economic affairs. 
However, this is not a particularly original argument. Indeed, Ngũgĩ ’s 
imaginative critique of Africa’s West-leaning neocolonial “bourgeoisie” 
marks Wizard as the most recent variation on a Fanonian theme that he 
has addressed repeatedly in his work at least since the groundbreaking 
Devil on the Cross (1980), his first novel in Gĩkũyũ. Interpretations of 
Wizard have recognized its significant formal innovations—for exam-
ple, in combining various techniques of African orature with the novel 
form—and their relationship to a range of neocolonial themes, but such 
analyses take for granted the timeliness of those themes, when in reality 
African nations are experiencing a new and arguably very different set of 
risks and opportunities in the era of globalization.2 Literary critics such 
as Joseph McLaren discuss the novel’s shift toward questions of globaliza-
tion, but in such readings the phenomenon continues to have a Western 
character. “Ngũgĩ shows,” writes McLaren, “that the West and global 
capital are implicated in the dilemmas of African leadership” (152). 
Increasingly, however, it is not the West’s as much as the East’s global 
capital that is implicated in the dilemmas and dreams of African leaders.3
135
Ch ina -A f r i c a  Re l a t i on s  and  Po l i t i c a l  Cond i t i on s
A second and more intriguing answer to the question of the Ruler’s 
reason for rejecting Beijing can therefore be found in the remainder of 
Wizard’s sweeping narrative. The Ruler’s reference to the East, in other 
words, is the first but not the last.4 Following the Ruler’s speech, a re-
markably prescient thematic and formal thread emerges that is borne 
out through a series of intertexts, allusions, and characters that reference 
India, China, Buddhism, Taoism, Asian mysticism, and other Eastern 
political, philosophical, and religious ideas. Ngũgĩ published his novel 
at the putative beginning of China’s aggressive foray into Africa, but 
he wrote the text over the previous decade during the key years lead-
ing up to the FOCAC Summit. As such, the novel appears to regis-
ter the growing influence of the East in Africa in the early twenty-first 
century. From one perspective, China (more on India below), with its 
single-minded interest in African natural resources and willingness to 
skirt international laws to obtain them, seems poised to repeat the co-
lonial pattern of economic exploitation (although claims to this effect 
in Western media can also be read as evidence of the West’s anxieties 
about its own declining global influence).5 From another perspective, 
however, China’s investments and apparent political neutrality have the 
potential to boost African economies significantly.6 Although I tend 
toward the former assessment, it is necessary at least to recognize argu-
ments on all sides of the issue and consider the possibility that China 
may have something positive to offer Africa. This, I argue, is the real 
reason Ngũgĩ ’s dictator rejects Beijing. The Ruler’s disdainful reference 
to Mao reflects his continued alliance with the West, yet the novel as a 
whole explores but does not commit to a very different view of what the 
East has to offer. Standing, in effect, on the cusp of a global transition 
from a world dominated by the West to one experiencing the effects of 
the “economic renaissance of East Asia,” as Giovanni Arrighi terms it 
(1), Ngũgĩ’s novel reiterates his critique of neocolonialism and, perhaps 
more importantly, marks the growing presence of the East in Africa and 
offers ways of understanding the meaning of that presence in an era of 
global capital.7 
It is important to acknowledge, of course, that Ngũgĩ is interested in 
more than China. In a 2004 interview, for example, he explained that 
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he hoped the novel would demonstrate that “an African language can 
talk about anything in the world. It can talk about Brazil, India, Asia, 
China, astronomy, philosophy, and so on” (Rodrigues 167). However, 
although many of the novel’s references to Asia apply specifically to 
India, my focus is China. Not only does the text contain as many if 
not more references to China, the issues and themes that emerge from 
the novel’s attention to Asia’s looming presence in Africa resonate in 
intriguing ways with issues particular to the unique character of China’s 
policies and modes of economic and diplomatic engagement. India, of 
course, also has significant economic interests there, but its presence 
has been, to date, somewhat less aggressive and far less ubiquitous.8 
Furthermore, India has a history with Africa that is very different from 
China’s. Indeed, economist Azar Jammine argues that the fact that 
Indians have had a considerable presence on the continent for dec-
ades and share the English language with many Africans makes India 
a “more natural trade partner” than China (qtd. in Baldauf ). These 
issues are worth exploring in relationship to Ngũgĩ’s novel and, in fact, 
the topic of India in Africa is currently quite popular in literary stud-
ies: a 2011 special issue of Research in African Literatures, for example, 
was devoted to the topic of “Asian African Literatures,” with a focus on 
South Asian writers and cultures in Africa. Additionally, scholars such 
as Guarav Desai, Stephanie Jones, and Isabel Hofmeyr have contrib-
uted significantly to our understanding of “Indian Ocean Literatures,” 
or those narratives that “call attention to the multiple legacies, histo-
ries, and identities that have long circulated in the world of the Indian 
Ocean,” including those circulating between India and Africa (Desai 
718).9 As important as these perspectives are and as fruitful as it would 
be to apply them to Wizard, my purpose in this paper is somewhat dif-
ferent. I am less interested in how the novel calls attention to the histo-
ries of East Africa’s relationship to India than I am in how the novel can 
be brought into conversation with the more recent history of China’s 
presence in Africa, a topic that has been largely neglected in scholarship 
of African literature. Key themes emerge in Wizard around the broad 
topic of Asia in Africa that reflect and relate to China’s core policy of 
offering aid “without political conditions.” These themes ultimately 
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offer a distinctive way of bringing the novel to bear upon contempo-
rary debates specific to China in Africa.
In fact, because it appeared in 2006, Wizard actually anticipates the 
bulk of commentaries in the social sciences and news media and offers 
an equally sophisticated perspective on the possibilities and dangers of 
African relationships with the East.10 In particular, the novel’s inter-
ventionary masterstroke is its indirect and ambiguous representations 
of the East as offering or modeling, from its stance of political neutral-
ity, a more “therapeutic” relationship with modernity, technology, and 
development than the West (Williams 393).11 Ngũgĩ’s novel tests and 
explores the limits of these ideas but, despite their promise, ultimately 
rejects them and reaffirms the immediate necessity of political engage-
ment as well as the power and efficacy of indigenous African forms of 
art, philosophy, and ingenuity for defining modernity and achieving 
the aims of political action. In what follows, I focus on several stages 
of discursive exploration in the novel as the narrative moves from nos-
talgia for China’s revolutionary past and recognition of the damaging 
effects of Western hegemony to a tentative experiment with the spiritual 
and (purportedly) politically-neutral qualities of Eastern philosophy to, 
finally, an awareness that any philosophy which refuses political engage-
ment, or refuses to recognize that everything is political, will not, or 
should not, thrive in Africa. Hence, although the novel facilitates a per-
spective initially open to what China has to offer, it ultimately suggests 
that China’s claim to be free of “political conditions” is deeply flawed. 
In effect, the novel asserts its own conditions for political cooperation 
in the age of globalization: Africa can work with and learn from China, 
India, and other international partners, but such work and cooperation 
must be on equal terms. 
Conditional Effects: Prestige Projects and Political Humiliation in 
Africa
By beginning Wizard with, among other things, an image of a former 
Maoist whom the Ruler reformed, Ngũgĩ demonstrates how far the 
post-independence African state has strayed from its revolutionary his-
tory and the principles exemplified by others who share that history.12 
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The significance of the novel’s reference to Mao, however, and of its 
subsequent discourse about Asia, can be best understood if we begin by 
looking to the larger context in which the Ruler voices his opposition 
to Mao. As noted, the Ruler’s statement comes during a public cere-
mony at which his sycophantic ministers have presented him with a 
gift. A central component of the novel’s parodic critique has to do with 
the gift, which is a proposal for a literally-over-the-top building project 
called “Marching to Heaven.” In an effort to lift the Ruler to a physi-
cal height that reflects his (imagined) global preeminence, the Foreign 
Minister, Machokali, proposes to “raise a building to the very gates of 
Heaven so that the Ruler could call on God daily. . . . The Ruler would 
be the daily recipient of God’s advice, resulting in a rapid growth of 
Aburĩria to heights never before dreamt by humans” (Ngũgĩ 16). The 
Ruler is exceptionally pleased with this proposal and gives his blessing, 
authorizing Machokali to begin courting the New York-based Global 
Bank for construction loans. Compare this fictional project to some of 
the major building projects that have taken place in Africa in recent 
years: new foreign affairs ministry offices in Angola and Mozambique, 
sports stadiums in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, a 
new African Union building in Ethiopia, and presidential palaces in 
DR Congo and Zimbabwe (Alden 23). All of these and more have 
been funded or directly built by the Chinese government and are ex-
amples of what Chris Alden calls “symbolic diplomacy” and “prestige 
projects”: gifts to African rulers as a sign of good faith and a means 
of initiating or guaranteeing commitment to bilateral diplomatic and 
economic ventures.13 Shortly after the 2006 FOCAC summit, the 
head of China’s Export Import Bank predicted that over the next three 
years, more than $20 billion would be provided to finance Chinese 
exports and business in Africa, compared to the $17 billion in loan 
commitments to Africa from the World Bank (the model for Ngũgĩ ’s 
“Global Bank”) over the same period (Brautigam 2). Furthermore, in 
2009, China surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner, with 
a trade balance of $79.8 billion compared to the US’ $78.9 billion 
(Wonacott). Estimates of subsequent years have placed China’s trade 
balance with Africa at over $100 billion.14 Do these projects and num-
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bers suggest that China is the real source of funding for developments 
in the vein of Marching to Heaven? 
Despite the similarities, there is a major difference between Marching 
to Heaven and China’s prestige projects: beyond the proposal, 
Marching to Heaven is never begun, much less completed. In response 
to the pointless and economically disastrous project, an activist move-
ment—the Movement for the Voice of the People—begins a campaign 
of resistance and agitation. The bulk of the novel follows the intersect-
ing plots as the government devises increasingly desperate means of 
begging for Western money and the Movement finds increasingly crea-
tive ways of disrupting the Ruler’s self-aggrandizing activities. Indeed, 
the Movement’s ability to undermine the Ruler’s authority and create 
political unrest prevents him from obtaining loans from the “mis-
sionaries” of the Global Bank. When he fails to court representatives 
from the Bank during their visit to Aburĩria, the Ruler, Machokali, and 
others travel to New York City, where the Ruler hopes to address the 
United Nations and finally secure the loans from the Bank. Despite his 
best efforts, however, the Ruler is continually rebuffed, ignored, and 
humiliated by the US government and the Global Bank. Just when the 
Ruler believes the loans will be approved, the Bank sends a letter stat-
ing that there are no clear “economic benefits to Marching to Heaven,” 
and the funds cannot be released without a stronger justification for 
the project (Ngũgĩ 485). Later, after the Ruler has begun to suffer the 
effects of a mysterious illness brought on by the Bank’s refusal, a group 
of “Bank diplomats” humiliate him further by chastising him for allow-
ing political unrest in Aburĩria, caused in part by the Movement for the 
Voice of the People (497). “Put your house in order,” they command. 
“Then send us a memorandum addressing anything new you wish us 
to consider. The Bank will review it thoroughly” (500). This is the first 
of several instances in which the Global Bank and representatives of 
the US and other Western governments impose conditions on funds. 
The fictional US Ambassador, Gabriel Gemstone, tells the Ruler that 
Washington and “the capitals of the leading industrial democracies” 
are “concern[ed] about what [is] happening in the State of Aburĩria” 
(578). At one point late in the novel, the funds from the Bank are still 
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available, but first “[t]he Ruler had to come up with peaceful meas-
ures to end the unrest in the country” (640). When the unrest does not 
end, the Bank not only decides definitively against loans for Marching 
to Heaven, but they “put on hold even those funds previously agreed 
upon. Worse still, the funds would remain frozen until the Aburĩrian 
government had instituted economic and political reforms and took 
concrete steps to end inflation and corruption” (649). The Ruler is ut-
terly humiliated—the narrator describes his “injured dignity” (581)—
by the constant “warnings, threats, and wishes,” or political conditions, 
the West insists upon (583). 
As noted above, the hallmark principle of China’s foreign policy in 
Africa has been the absence of “political conditions.” In contrast, Alden 
describes the “unadulterated use of conditionalities by Western donors” 
(16) and states that the “West’s employment of conditionalities” is 
“merely the latest in decades of humiliating experiences at the hands 
of former colonial powers and the United States” (20). The Ruler’s 
experiences with the Global Bank and US diplomats reflect these hu-
miliating practices and provide commentary on this uneven political 
dynamic. On the one hand, we of course do not want the Ruler to 
obtain the money for Marching to Heaven and thereby drive his coun-
try into irrecoverable debt. The Global Bank and Gemstone are justi-
fied in their hesitance, and ultimate refusal, to fund the project and 
have valid points in insisting that the Ruler end corruption, inflation, 
and unrest; these are desirable goals. On the other hand, the satirical 
nature of Ngũgĩ’s representation of the diplomats and the fact that they 
attribute the Ruler’s problems in part to the Movement for the Voice 
of the People suggest that they do not have Aburĩria’s best interests at 
heart and are more concerned with controlling the Ruler and his nation 
than helping the Aburĩrian people. Consequently, although the Ruler is 
the object of satire and ridicule throughout the novel, we cannot help 
but feel some sympathy for him when he is ignored, mistreated, and 
infantilized by the West simply because he is a black African. The East 
does not save him from this humiliation directly and we can only spec-
ulate on whether or not the Chinese government would have funded 
Marching to Heaven had the Ruler approached them rather than the 
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Global Bank. It seems likely were they to see it as a prestige project 
but unlikely were they interested in any kind of direct benefit to them-
selves. The point, of course, is to note the contrast between the West’s 
use of conditionalities (in the novel and the real world) and China’s his-
torical willingness to build and invest in Africa without political condi-
tions. The fictional counterpart of this phenomenon is found in the 
titular “Wizard of the Crow,” to whom the Ruler’s ministers turn for 
help in healing his disease. 
When the doctors and scientists in New York fail to understand the 
nature and origins of the Ruler’s illness, the symptoms of which in-
clude balloonish corporeal swelling, dubbed “Self-Induced Expansion” 
or SIE, and speech that is stuck on the word “if,”15 the Wizard is flown 
out from Aburĩria to see if his renowned powers of sorcery can relieve 
the Ruler’s ailments. Using a simple divining technique, the Wizard 
succeeds in releasing the Ruler’s tongue, and when the Ruler speaks, 
the depth of his humiliation and of the pathology resulting from the 
racialized basis of that humiliation becomes clear. The Wizard states 
what he takes to be the questions stuck in the Ruler’s throat, expressed, 
significantly, in conditional terms: “IF I had been white, would they [the 
Global Bank] have done what they did to me? Or, IF I had been white 
would they have treated me the way they just did in the presence of my 
ministers?” (491; emphasis in original). The Ruler speaks at last and 
confirms the diagnosis: “That’s right. . . . That’s what I was trying to tell 
them” (491). The Ruler is paralyzed by the humiliation he suffers at the 
hands of the West and is freed by the healing powers of the Wizard, the 
figure through whom discourse about Asia most clearly emerges in the 
novel, particularly on the important question of whether or not one 
can, or should, maintain a stance of political neutrality as China claims 
to do in its relations with Africa. To fully understand the significance of 
what the Wizard achieves in healing the Ruler of his “malady of words” 
(349)—which he does without political conditions—and the signifi-
cance of the Wizard as a personified litmus test for modes of under-
standing China-Africa relationships, we must turn to earlier sections 
of the novel and trace the role of the East in shaping the Wizard as a 
master of “modern” sorcery (405). 
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Life Apart from Politics: Testing the Promise of Buddhism and 
Asia-as-Technê
Discussions of the novel have yet to account fully for the fact that the 
novel is titled Wizard of the Crow: the Wizard is an important character, 
no doubt, but he is a reluctant participant in political action, and other 
characters are just as central and much more politically involved (on 
both sides) than he. Why, then, does the novel carry his name, or title, 
instead of the Ruler’s?16 My response is that Ngũgĩ wants us to resist 
giving the Ruler too much attention and instead consider more deeply 
the significance of the Wizard, not simply as someone who progresses 
from political detachment to political activism, as I will show, but some-
one who represents possible modes of structuring present and future 
relationships with the East, an immediate and forward-looking concern. 
The correspondence between the Wizard’s willingness to help the ruth-
less dictator of Aburĩria and China’s policy of offering aid and assistance 
in the same politically-neutral mode is reinforced by the Wizard’s gen-
eral philosophy of political detachment which defines his relationships 
and actions up to the moment when he heals the Ruler. 
When we first meet the Wizard, a few chapters after the Marching 
to Heaven ceremony, he is known simply as Kamĩtĩ: he has not yet 
become the Wizard and appears to be little more than another beggar 
on the streets of Aburĩria. In reality, despite his thread-bare and care-
worn appearance after months of failing to find work, Kamĩtĩ is highly 
educated and holds degrees in economics and business administration 
from India, where he also studied herbology and all varieties of Eastern 
religion, history, and philosophy. However, others in the novel see this 
education as less prestigious than what one could receive in the West. 
In particular, Titus Tajirika, the Chairman of Marching to Heaven and 
owner of a major real estate company to whom Kamĩtĩ confidently ap-
peals for a job, scoffs at Kamĩtĩ ’s education and invokes stereotypes of 
Indians being unfair and intrusive businesspeople in Africa. Kamĩtĩ 
responds: “My opinion is that there are many things we could learn 
from India and other Asian countries, just as they have much to learn 
from us” (55). Titus eventually tires of listening to Kamĩtĩ and turns 
him away. Although the Chairman rejects his enthusiastic display of his 
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Eastern education (just as the Ruler rejects, or at least reforms, Maoists), 
Kamĩtĩ ’s exchange with Titus provides a clear view of his optimistic at-
titude toward Asia and the promise of cooperation and mutual benefit. 
Because this optimism changes significantly by the end of the novel, 
Ngũgĩ does not necessarily endorse Kamĩtĩ ’s position. But given the 
newness of contemporary Chinese and African relationships, it is pos-
sible to read Kamĩtĩ ’s position as one way of constructing or defining 
Africa’s connection to the East. Scholars, politicians, and others have de-
bated whether China is to be seen as a partner, competitor, or colonizer 
(Alden 6).17 At this early stage in the novel, there is hope that Africa may 
be able to learn from Asian countries and vice versa. 
In subsequent chapters, Kamĩtĩ articulates some of Asia’s lessons for 
Africa; most concern developing a more heightened spiritual awareness 
and a deeper connection to nature, both of which also entail politi-
cal neutrality. For example, after being rejected by Titus, Kamĩtĩ begins 
a relationship with the Chairman’s secretary, Nyawĩra, who secretly 
leads the Movement for the Voice of the People. She conceals this from 
Kamĩtĩ for much of the novel, although she makes her opposition to the 
Ruler clear and declares her belief in the necessity of political engage-
ment. “The water I drink, the food I eat, the clothes I wear, the bed I 
sleep on,” she states, “are all determined by politics, good or bad. Politics 
is about power and how it is used. Politics involves choosing sides in the 
struggle for power” (Ngũgĩ 86–87). She then asks Kamĩtĩ, “So on which 
side are you?” (87). He responds by asserting his belief in “humanity, 
divine, indivisible” (87), rather than in a particular political position. 
“Kamĩtĩ,” the narrator tells us, “wanted to lead a decent life apart from 
politics,” and after witnessing some of the political realities of Aburĩria, 
he decides to leave that indecent life behind and become a monk-like 
ascetic in the forest (129). When Nyawĩra tracks him down and resumes 
their discussion about politics, Kamĩtĩ offers an impassioned speech on 
Eastern thought, which appears to justify his retreat from modern life. 
“I was drawn to the religions of the East,” he begins, speaking of his 
time in India. “I wanted to learn more about the prophets and teachers 
from the East like Buddha, Jain’s Mahavira, Guru Nanak of the Sikhs, 
and even Confucius of China” (210). He describes his fascination with 
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the concepts of “karma” and “nirvana” and implies a parallel between 
his sylvan retreat and that of the Buddha, who reached enlightenment 
“lying between two large trees in a forest” (211). Kamĩtĩ concludes his 
speech by begging Nyawĩra, who wants to return to fight the Ruler, to 
stay with him: “Let’s build a shelter here; listen to what the trees and the 
animals have to tell us” (211). In other words, the narrator explains, he 
asks her to turn her back on Aburĩria “so as to become a hermit, one 
of the children of the new-millennium Buddha .  .  . searching for the 
meaning of life” (211–12). Kamĩtĩ believes that one of the lessons to be 
learned from Eastern thought is that there is a higher, more enlightened 
mode of existence that allows one to stand above and beyond the politi-
cal conditions of modern life. 
This romanticized image of the East and the type of life outside poli-
tics that Kamĩtĩ believes Eastern thought makes possible seems to repeat 
conventional Orientalist characterizations of Asia as more deeply spir-
itual than other parts of the world and more exemplary in its concern 
for nature and enlightenment. Such characterizations envision Eastern 
spirituality as a contrast to the West’s superior, but spiritually empty, 
achievements in technology and even, at times, as a remedy for the 
harmful effects of Western industrialization and over-technologization. 
Indeed, in Wizard the West is a place where technology and indus-
trial excess undermine spirituality (e.g., in the belief that Marching to 
Heaven, funded by the West, will make the Ruler equal to God) and 
where technology is used in ways contrary to nature. Three of the Ruler’s 
ministers, for example, travel to different Western countries where they 
have body parts unnaturally altered in order to gain favor with the 
Ruler. Machokali has his eyes enlarged to the size of light bulbs to enable 
him “to spot the Ruler’s enemies” (13–14). Titus Tajirika, believing he 
will never reach his true economic potential until he becomes a white 
American, finds a clinic in New York City that specializes in “genetic 
engineering, cloning, transplants, and plastic surgery” (741). Titus man-
ages to have an arm and a leg transplant to replace his own with white 
limbs, as if to say, perhaps, that Titus “would give an arm and a leg” 
to be white (742).18 Such examples, satirical as they are, suggest that 
the West’s supposedly superior achievements in technology are actually 
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deeply harmful to the mind and spirit and that the East offers a model 
of spirituality that leads to more enlightened modes of being, including 
a deeper appreciation for indigenous African ideas, beliefs, and customs. 
In fact, Kamĩtĩ relates the Eastern concept of karma to that of “the chi 
among the Ibo” (210), suggesting that the spiritual sensitivity he has 
learned through Eastern thought has actually helped him rediscover in-
digenous African ideas and beliefs.19 Despite the hint of an Orientalist 
ring to the novel’s contrast between Western technology and Eastern 
spirituality, however, there is a much more productive and nuanced way 
to read Kamĩtĩ’s, and the novel’s, discourse about the East that reveals a 
complex perspective on how Africa can make sense of its relationships 
with Asia. In particular, I argue that Ngũgĩ is testing the possibilities of 
a discourse comparable to what R. John Williams identifies as “Asia-as-
technê” (392). 
Williams defines and analyzes the discourse of “Asia-as-technê” as 
it appeared in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century American 
literature and culture when fears about the negative effects of techno-
logical development and industrialization corresponded to an emerging 
belief that “therapeutic alternatives to the overtechnologization . . . of 
Western modernity” could be found in the East (392–93). Williams 
borrows the term “technê” from Heidegger and explains that, more 
than “simply a return to ‘nature,’ the move toward technê is an at-
tempt to resurrect some ancient skill or craftsmanship, and to iden-
tify—against the efficient and inhuman technologies of modernity—an 
aesthetic more conducive to a romantic concept of organic wholeness” 
(393). Through his education in Eastern thought, Kamĩtĩ does not 
simply return to nature—although that is his first impulse—but in be-
coming the “Wizard of the Crow” and discovering his innate gifts in 
the art of divination he resurrects an ancient skill, combining Eastern 
and African philosophies, that he sees not as (tech-less) magic but aes-
theticized “science”—in other words, technê (Ngũgĩ 151). Williams 
demonstrates how Anglo-American “advocates of Asia-as-technê” in 
the early twentieth century saw the East as a means of recovering “the 
essence of some misplaced or as-yet-unfulfilled modern identity,” to 
which the West, because of its headlong immersion in “industrial life,” 
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was blind (393). More than simply offering an anti-modern alterna-
tive to technology, Asia-as-technê could facilitate more “therapeutic,” 
or more natural relationships with technology that would, in turn, lead 
to more “positive and organic forms of modernity outside the racialized 
hierarchies of traditional Western technics” (Williams 394). This is pre-
cisely how the discourse about Asia in Wizard functions, at least in its 
early forms: not as an Orientalist idealization of Eastern spirituality but 
as an acknowledgement that the East may offer a different and more 
natural path to modernity than the spiritually bankrupt, capital-driven, 
unnaturally-technologized model of the West. 
In addition to Kamĩtĩ, one other figure in the novel represents the 
politically-detached, enlightenment-focused aspects of the East and 
reinforces the discourse of Asia-as-technê in the narrative: Gau tama, 
proprietor of the protagonists’ favorite coffee house, The Mars Café. 
Gau tama, who invokes the Buddha through his name, is notoriously 
unconcerned with politics because he is deeply and obsessively inter-
ested in space exploration. Hence the name of his establishment, which 
changes periodically to reflect different achievements in space travel: 
Sput nik, Vostok, Moonapollo, Mir Café, and International Space 
Station Café (Ngũgĩ 106). At first glance, the connotations of Gau-
tama’s name and his interests in advanced technology seem to have 
nothing to do with one another, but in the discourse of Asia-as-technê, 
Buddhism and technology are not incommensurable. Indeed, in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth-century US, part of Buddhism’s 
great appeal for influential figures like Lafcadio Hearn and Paul Caras 
was that it appeared to be compatible with “modern science” (Tweed 
106). As J. J. Clarke writes, “Many influential thinkers have found in 
the natural philosophies of China and India important precedents for 
the swing within the physical sciences in this century from an atomis-
tic/mechanistic mode of thinking to an organicist/holistic one” (167). 
Though a minor character in the novel, Gautama and his shrine to 
modern space exploration represent this uniquely holistic fulfillment of 
science through Eastern thought. Gautama most recently changed the 
name of his café to “Mars” because he believes the red planet to be the 
next frontier in space exploration where “the secrets of the origins of 
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life and the universe” will be discovered, and he wants the café’s name 
“to reflect the eternal human quest for truth, freedom, and knowledge” 
(Ngũgĩ 107; emphasis added). In Gautama’s view, technology is not 
something that allows humans to manipulate or dominate nature but 
instead to discover its mysteries and, in effect, strive for truth, freedom, 
knowledge—in a word, enlightenment. In this way, Gautama epito-
mizes the discourse of Asia-as-technê, the idea that alternative forms of 
modernity can be realized through Eastern perspectives on and engage-
ments with technology and science.20 
Up to a point in Wizard, Kamĩtĩ, like Gautama, exhibits both politi-
cal detachment and a belief in the alternative forms of modernity made 
possible by Asia-as-technê. Kamĩtĩ becomes the “Wizard” accidentally: 
police officers are pursuing him and Nyawĩra one night early in the 
novel and, in order to escape, they hide in a room protected by a fake 
but dangerous-looking “fetish” that Kamĩtĩ hangs outside with a warn-
ing about the powerful magic of the “Wizard of the Crow,” an identity 
he adopts to survive in the moment (77). The police are afraid to enter, 
but one of them returns the next day hoping that he can employ the 
Wizard to help him with some personal problems. Kamĩtĩ reluctantly 
plays along by pretending to perform divinations, but as he begins to 
treat others, the successful outcomes of his supposedly fake divinations 
suggest that he may have some genuine powers after all, and, in fact, 
he later learns from his father that he is descended from a long line 
of African seers (293–95). Kamĩtĩ ’s divination technique is interesting; 
though he is considered a sorcerer, he does little more than hold up a 
mirror to his patients and ask them to picture the source of their prob-
lems (typically an enemy of some kind). Kamĩtĩ is unusually insight-
ful in reading the problems of his patients through their words and 
mannerisms, and he then appears to use the mirror to “capture” the 
shadows of those problems, wiping them out by scratching the mirror 
(117).21
Word soon spreads of the Wizard’s powers, and each day more and 
more people come to his shrine for help. Most of those who initially 
come are greedy business owners who want their enemies weakened. 
While describing the process to one such person, Kamĩtĩ observes that 
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“[d]ivining is a science” (151). The strangeness of this claim is not lost 
on the patient, who responds, “I want the pure play of occult powers. 
I want magic, not science” (151). Kamĩtĩ, in other words, is not a con-
ventional sorcerer. Existing somewhere between the purely positivistic 
approach of the Western doctors who unsuccessfully treat the Ruler in 
New York and the “pure play of occult powers,” Kamĩtĩ is a “modern 
sorcerer” (405). He is not a slave to technology, nor is he completely 
against it. Instead, because we know that the source of his training 
lies in Eastern philosophy and religion and that it has brought out his 
innate powers as an African seer, we can say that Kamĩtĩ represents 
an African form of Asia-as-technê, practicing the “science” of divina-
tion by combining technology (the handheld mirror) with the arts of 
language (speaking and listening) and insight. As such, the politically 
neutral Kamĩtĩ/Wizard of the Crow at this stage suggests one way of 
understanding the possibility of alternative forms of modernity mod-
eled and offered by the East. Africans need not abandon African beliefs 
and ways of thought in favor of those of the East, but still, as Kamĩtĩ 
says, “there are many things we could learn from India and other Asian 
countries” (55).
Chinese Gourmet and the Middle Way: The Wizard of the Crow’s 
Noble Sevenfold Path
Kamĩtĩ ’s problematic belief that he can lead a life without political 
conditions, facilitated by the principles he has learned from the East, 
is tempered by Nyawĩra’s aggressive political activism and clear disap-
proval of Kamĩtĩ ’s position. They represent two extremes in the early 
stages of the novel. In the next phase of Kamĩtĩ ’s development, Ngũgĩ 
explores the possibility of a “middle way” in which Kamĩtĩ begins to 
recognize the importance of political involvement and Nyawĩra sees the 
positive aspects of Kamĩtĩ ’s technê-philosophy. Just as the Ruler begins 
preparations for his trip to New York, Nyawĩra is nearly caught by the 
police. She flees to Kamĩtĩ in the forest for safety—her first concession 
to Kamĩtĩ ’s lifestyle. After resting for a few days, Nyawĩra prepares to 
return, but this time Kamĩtĩ decides to join her: “I confess,” he says, 
“that I may not be able to deal with the demands and the discipline 
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of your movement. I am not even sure whether I want to become a 
member. But a fellow traveler in the journey against the evil you are 
fighting? Yes. . . . You and I can work together, you with matters of the 
body and I with those of the spirit. You women of Eldares have shown 
the way” (265–66). Nyawĩra asks what he means by “way,” and he re-
sponds with the opening lines of the Tao te Ching : 
The way that can be told of is not the eternal way
The name that can be named is not the eternal name
The nameless is the origin of heaven and Earth  
 (266; emphasis in original)
This invocation of the Tao is an example of one of the many Eastern 
texts through which Kamĩtĩ interprets his and Nyawĩra’s experiences. It 
initiates a discussion about what the two characters can learn from one 
another and whether there is a way for them to work together without 
either compromising his or her principles. Upon returning to Eldares, 
they decide to hide in plain sight by dressing in traditional attire and 
resuming the work of the Wizard. They build a new shrine and call it 
“The House of Modern Witchcraft and Sorcery,” where both rich and 
poor are welcome (274). In addition to performing divinations, they 
outline a set of “seven suggestions for healthy living,” which they share 
with their patients: 
Take care of the body, for it is the temple of the soul
Watch ye what you eat and drink all the time
Greed makes death greedy for life
Cigarettes arrest life; alcohol holds the mind prisoner
Life is a common stream from which plant, animal, and humans  
 draw
The good comes from balance
Don’t abandon yours for a mirage  
 (275; emphasis in original)
They call the suggestions the “Seven Herbs of Grace” (275) after one 
of Nyawĩra’s names, but the list bears an interesting resemblance to 
Buddhism’s “Noble Eightfold Path,” at least in the way it addresses 
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physical vices and spiritual ambition. As recounted in the Pali canon 
of Theravada Buddhism, the Buddha once spoke to a group of monks 
cautioning them from indulging in the two extremes of addiction to 
“sense pleasures” and “self-mortification” (“Dhammacakkappavattana”). 
By avoiding these two extremes, the Buddha says, one can discover the 
“Middle Path,” which he identifies specifically as “the Noble Eightfold 
path, and nothing else, namely: right understanding, right thought, 
right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindful-
ness and right concentration” (“Dhammacakkappavattana”). Although 
Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra’s points are somewhat more specific and poetic, 
they strive for a goal similar to that of the Buddha: a “middle path” or 
balance in life.22
The resemblance between the Buddhist path and the Seven Herbs is 
further reinforced by the setting in which Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra come 
up with the principles: they are eating in another of their favorite 
restaurants, Chou Chinese Gourmet. It is not unusual, of course, for 
such a restaurant to be in Africa—there are Chinese restaurants in 
cities throughout the continent. However, the restaurant is a favorite 
location, and the reason for this is significant. Chou Chinese Gourmet 
is “a happy medium between the high-class and the run-down restau-
rants, both extremes often the haunts of police intelligence” (Ngũgĩ 
311; emphasis added). Just as Nyawĩra was safe with Kamĩtĩ in his 
new-millennium Buddha-esque retreat in the forest, there is safety 
in the “happy medium” or “Middle Path” of the Chinese restaurant 
that is miraculously free from the dangerous politics that afflict public 
spaces at either extreme of the economic scale. Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra 
begin sharing the Seven Herbs with all of their patients and providing 
food to the hungry. They designate a “holy day when people were to 
think of the mind and body as a wholeness that made up a person,” 
which they call “the Day of the Way” (275–76). Combining Taoist 
philosophy with the Middle Path and more specific principles tailored 
to African conditions, Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra’s Seven Herbs allow them 
to remain in the political world where they can treat social, physical, 
and spiritual ailments in a holistic and organic way and, at the same 
time, maintain a form of political neutrality as they treat any and all 
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who come to them. Nyawĩra does not give up her politics, but she 
comes to see the value of attending to things of the spirit. 
Significantly, in the chapter immediately preceding the one 
in which the Seven Herbs are introduced, the Ruler leaves for the 
US. Just as the Ruler falls into the trap of Western humiliation, the 
Wizard reaches an apogee in his optimistic efforts to combine Eastern 
and African ideas. He and Nyawĩra develop an African version of 
the Noble Eightfold Path and thereby demonstrate another possible 
way of envisioning a productive alliance between Africa and the East. 
We know, of course, that the Wizard is then called upon to treat the 
Ruler in New York, and, because he dispenses his assistance “without 
political conditions” to good and bad alike, the Wizard willingly ap-
plies his technê-divination to the Ruler, successfully diagnosing and 
(partially) healing him when the rigidly scientific American doctors 
fail. The Eastern principles that guide the Wizard in resurrecting the 
“ancient skill”—or technê—of divination and becoming a modern 
sorcerer allow him to intervene in the West’s humiliation of the Ruler 
(Williams 393). The Ruler is humiliated by the Global Bank’s dogged 
use of political conditions, and he is healed from that humiliation by 
the Eastern-trained modern sorcerer who offers assistance without po-
litical conditions. When read in the context of current China-African 
relations, this again offers a distinctly hopeful view that there may 
be something to China’s insistence that its model of modernization 
and assistance without political conditions holds promise for Africa. 
However, this view is exploratory at this point in the novel. I will 
therefore conclude by looking at the final stage in Kamĩtĩ ’s progress 
in which the realities of African life make political detachment and 
neutrality impossible. 
Madness as Detachment from Political Reality, or Rejecting the 
Buddha
As noted, Kamĩtĩ only partly heals the Ruler in New York: he releases 
his tongue and correctly diagnoses the disease, but he leaves before 
curing the Ruler’s SIE. Kamĩtĩ is prompted to return to Aburĩria 
after having an “out of body” experience. For the second time in the 
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novel, in fact, Kamĩtĩ experiences a kind of astral projection in which 
he leaves his body and flies around the world in a “global journey in 
search of the source of black power” (731). He describes his experi-
ence to Nyawĩra, who asks if he found the source. He replies, “Yes, in 
the unity of our blackness” (731). Much happens between the jour-
ney and Kamĩtĩ ’s description of it late in the novel, but, most impor-
tantly, Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra witness the Ruler’s return and subsequent 
assassination in a coup d’état staged by Titus Tajirika, who renames 
himself “Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus Whitehead” (753). The 
Ruler, to whom critics have given so much attention, suddenly disap-
pears, only to be replaced by another who promises to outshine his 
predecessor with megalomaniacal flair. The Wizard is also shot (during 
a public gathering in which the government tries to pressure him to 
reveal Nyawĩra’s whereabouts), but he survives, and his astral-vision 
of the sources of black power ultimately offers an image that contrasts 
with the dictatorial power that has passed, and will continue to pass, 
from one African Ruler to the next. Nyawĩra is initially dismissive of 
Kamĩtĩ ’s mystical journey, but when she finally takes him to meet the 
Central Committee of the Movement because, at last, “he wanted to 
become a member” (756), he sees on a wall of their hideout a map of 
the world with arrows pointing “at the centers of ancient black civi-
lization” (757). “They are,” someone tells him, “the sources of black 
power,” and he realizes that they are the same places he visited during 
his astral projection, including locations throughout Africa as well as in 
India, the Caribbean, South America, and Fiji (757). Kamĩtĩ has come 
to a full awareness of the truth of Nyawĩra’s belief that all things are 
determined by politics and that one must choose a side in the struggle 
for power. His discovery of the map confirms to him that his choice to 
join the Movement is the right one and also reveals the extent to which 
his—and by extension the novel’s—faith in the East has broken down. 
Kamĩtĩ finally recognizes the futility and impossibility of leading a life 
detached from political conditions. 
Nyawĩra gives Kamĩtĩ a tour of the Movement’s “new venture” 
in the Eldares mountains where they have built a utopian commu-
nity grounded in African ways of living. Their farms, where they are 
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“working with nature, not against it,” are filled with all “varieties of 
Aburĩrian” fruits and vegetables; their soldiers are deeply patriotic, 
committed to bringing about a “new Aburĩria”; and their library is not 
only something from which they take, but, Nyawĩra says, “we also have 
a duty to add to the common store” (758–59). In other words, Africans 
can learn from others but also have much to contribute. Kamĩtĩ thinks 
to himself that “knowledge was nothing more than the art of looking 
at what we already know with different eyes,” and he gains knowledge 
by looking at African modes of belief, thought, and ingenuity with dif-
ferent eyes (759). This passionate commitment to indigenous African 
culture—indeed, a commitment built on the assumption that alterna-
tive forms of modernity can be attained through African, rather than 
Western or Eastern, modes of being—does not preclude cooperation 
with Asia. It does, however, set certain conditions for cooperation. After 
viewing the Movement’s library, Kamĩtĩ is taken to their hospital where 
he was treated the night he was shot. When Nyawĩra mentions that 
a Dr. Patel performed the surgery, Kamĩtĩ interrupts: “What? Some 
Aburo-Asians?” (759; “Aburo,” interestingly, would be pronounced 
“Afro”). Nyawĩra answers, “Yes, for it does not mean that all the 
Asians in Aburĩria support the current program of ogres. Like black 
Aburĩrians, some work with the forces of oppression, while others toil 
on the side of the people” (760). Unity “across race and ethnic lines” 
is possible if all have chosen the correct side in the struggle for power 
(760). Political neutrality simply is not possible, and, as a final image 
of the East in the novel attests, detachment from political reality—be-
cause reality is political—is akin to madness. 
Nyawĩra and Kamĩtĩ leave the MVP headquarters and return to 
the streets of Eldares, observing and discussing the changes that have 
come about following Titus Tajirika’s rise to power. They look for 
their favorite coffee house, the Mars Café, but find that it has been 
demolished. The site is now fenced off with a sign reading, “UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION: GLOBE INSURANCE CORPORATION: 
THE TALLEST BUILDING IN AFRICA; A REAL MARCHING 
TO HEAVEN” (762). They worry about Gautama briefly and Kamĩtĩ 
suggests they go to Chou Chinese Gourmet, but Nyawĩra responds 
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tersely, “It is a restaurant, not a coffeehouse” (762). Somehow, the 
“happy medium” has lost its appeal. They find another coffeehouse, 
which is unnamed, and later find a man sitting under a tree near the 
former site of Marching to Heaven. Nyawĩra sees the man and asks, 
“What is he doing there all alone with legs crossed Buddha fashion?” 
(764) The man, they realize, is Gautama. He has hung from the tree 
behind him some of the things he salvaged from his café, and after his 
former patrons greet him, Gautama thinks he has finally found some 
followers. He then speaks for two paragraphs about the Ramayana, “the 
silence of being,” “human dreams,” and space. “Listening to what the 
universe is telling us,” he says, “is the only way for the nations of this 
our earth to come together and find union with life” (764–65). His 
point seems clear and not unlike what Kamĩtĩ used to preach about 
learning from nature, though Gautama’s perspective is more global and 
connects the lessons of the universe with the “nations of the earth.” 
However, Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra’s response is strange: they turn their 
backs and walk away. The narrator then tells us, “They went away won-
dering if what they just saw and heard was not coming from a man 
who had lost his head over the loss of the Mars Café” (765). They be-
lieve Gautama has gone mad. Kamĩtĩ ’s transformation over the course 
of the novel leads him to a point where the idea of remaining detached 
from political reality and searching for the secrets of nature and the 
universe is a form of madness. In a sense, then, he rejects the Buddha. 
Any philosophy, Eastern or otherwise, that does not acknowledge the 
fundamental nature of politics in African life is simply impractical, 
unsustainable, and ultimately irrational. Taking this to the wider ques-
tion of China’s role in Africa, we might argue that the novel encourages 
distrust of China inasmuch as its leaders profess to act and give and 
engage without political conditions. Having explored through imagi-
native means what it would mean for Africa to adopt (or be adopted 
by) Eastern ideas and institutions, the novel directly challenges political 
neutrality and suggests that Africa turn not to countries like China for 
answers to its problems, but to itself. 
Thus, after dismissing the Eastern sage, Kamĩtĩ and Nyawĩra encoun-
ter another sage: a man named Arigaigai Gathere, or A.G., a former 
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police officer and now renowned storyteller who has played a key role 
in and helped to narrate much of the novel. He was the first police 
officer who came to the Wizard for help, and his eccentric and enthu-
siastic storytelling has helped make the Wizard a legend in Aburĩria. 
(A.G. also frequented the Mars Café earlier in the novel, overlapping 
for a time with the space and perhaps ambitions of Asia-as-technê.) The 
novel concludes with A.G. standing in the middle of a crowd, playing a 
traditional instrument and singing the story of the Wizard of the Crow 
as Nyawĩra and Kamĩtĩ continue to walk, hand in hand, “the sound of 
the one-string violin and the man’s voice following them” (766). Robert 
Spencer notes the emphasis on performance in Wizard and the extent to 
which the novel formally and thematically draws attention to the “per-
formativity” of dictatorial power and ultimately reminds us that such 
“power can be performed differently” (147). A.G.’s performance offers 
this reminder at a point in the narrative when we are left to wonder 
whether or not change can really occur—will the utopian experiment 
of the MVP prove successful or will the new dictator simply reinforce 
the status quo? 
In emphasizing the possibility of change, A.G. invokes the tradi-
tion of gĩcaandĩ, or the Gĩkũyũ performance tradition in which singers 
compete with one another in public forums, “providing a model for 
interpersonal and public discourse” (Gĩtĩtĩ 124). According to Gĩtahi 
Gĩtĩtĩ, the gĩcaandĩ singer serves multiple functions as a “diviner/priest, 
investigator, philosopher, counselor, comforter, the voice of conscience” 
(118); furthermore, as a mode of performance characterized by “dialec-
tical indeterminacy” (111) and competition, “[g]ĩcaandĩ is, ultimately, 
about self-generation and continuity: the storing of the seed for future 
planting involves a selection of the best” (123). A.G. inhabits the mul-
tiple roles of the gĩcaandĩ tradition in this closing scene, depicting an 
openness to the indeterminacy of the future and a firm commitment 
to indigenous modes of performance, thought, belief, and practice that 
are better suited to establishing the conditions for the emergence of a 
desirable future in Africa. 
Throughout the novel, as I argue, Kamĩtĩ and other characters ex-
plore and allow us to imagine what it means for Africa to embrace the 
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possibilities of cooperation with the East. The optimism of the early 
sections of the novel gives way to a growing skepticism toward any-
thing that claims political detachment as a strength, and, ultimately, 
the narrative tends toward an almost complete rejection of Eastern en-
tities that claim to offer something of value without political condi-
tions. In so doing, the novel insists upon its own political conditions: 
cooperation with others, such as China or India, is still possible, but 
with the stipulation that all recognize the madness of political detach-
ment—i.e., that detachment from politics is detachment from real-
ity—and all recognize the inherent value of indigenous African forms 
of thought, belief, and modernity, embodied in the image of A.G. at 
the novel’s conclusion. China’s claim to political neutrality in Africa 
has been seriously debated by scholars and commentators, and Ngũgĩ’s 
novel provides an imaginative means of engaging with these conversa-
tions. China should not be rejected on the basis of its revolutionary 
past, which is what the Ruler does, but neither should it be blindly 
embraced on the basis of its current claims to offer, without political 
conditions, a path to modernity. Ngũgĩ ultimately suggests that Africa 
look inward, rather than outward, for the existence of such paths and 
that China, India, and perhaps even the West are welcome to join 
these paths on the condition that they “toil on the side of the people” 
(Ngũgĩ 760).
Notes
 1 The 2006 Forum was not the first meeting involving African and Chinese lead-
ers. In fact, it was both a culmination of meetings since the late 1990s and an 
inauguration of new commitments and relationships on a much larger scale. 
Rotberg notes that this most recent era is actually the third stage in a long his-
tory of interactions between China and the African continent, the previous two 
having been during the Ming Dynasty in the fifteenth century and the period 
of decolonization in the 1960s when communist China expressed support for 
various independence movements, though, at the time, with no major econom-
ic motives (“Preface” vii-viii). Since China’s “more recent movement away from 
socialism,” the ties between Africa and China have grown ever deeper (Alden 
38). For a more detailed account of the complex history leading up to China’s 
new commitment to Africa, see Anshan (22–36) and Brautigam (chapters 1 
and 2).
157
Ch ina -A f r i c a  Re l a t i on s  and  Po l i t i c a l  Cond i t i on s
 2 In “The Postcolonial Wizard,” for example, Gikandi describes Wizard as “the 
culmination of a long process by the novelist to overcome the ostensible gap 
between orality and writing” (156). Furthermore, Gikandi claims that Wizard 
is simply a “rewriting of Devil on the Cross,” recognizing the clear similarities 
between the two novels in critiquing neocolonialism (161). Ndĩgĩrĩgĩ, like 
McLaren, considers the turn toward questions of globalization in Wizard but 
in the end remains preoccupied with the distance this turn implies in terms of 
Ngũgĩ ’s relationship to Kenya. The author’s “exile,” Ndĩgĩrĩgĩ writes, “makes his 
view of Kenyan realities partial at best” (71), and, as a result, the novel demon-
strates how “Ngũgĩ embraced all of Africa as home” (74). Other approaches, 
such as those of Okolo and Colson, have read the novel as an imaginative explo-
ration of an “African public sphere,” or democratic space, where “society’s values 
and practices” can be discussed and evaluated, but the focus tends to remain on 
the role that such a sphere plays in resistance to the neocolonial problems that 
the Ruler and his Ministers represent (Okolo 59). In focusing on such themes, 
Okolo recognizes that “there is nothing new in the ethical commitment of the 
novel,” even if that commitment is still necessary in the fight against those who 
“manipulat[e] power as an instrument of destruction” (64). I would amend 
Okolo’s observation to say that although there is nothing new in the novel’s ethi-
cal commitment to resisting Western-influenced forms of neocolonial power, 
there is something new in the novel’s ethical commitment to exploring new 
relationships with the East, as I demonstrate. 
 3 The history and implications of this phenomenon have been amply document-
ed in the social sciences with a mass of commentary on Chinese-African rela-
tions published since 2006. Indeed, few topics have received as much atten-
tion among scholars of African politics and economics in the last several years. 
A partial list of the books on the phenomenon of “China in Africa” since the 
Forum in 2006 include: Alden, China in Africa; Manji and Marks, African Per-
spectives on China in Africa; Rotberg, China into Africa; Waldron, China in Af-
rica; Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift; Michel and Beuret, China on Safari; Raine, 
China’s New African Challenges; Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa; van Dijk, 
The New Presence of China in Africa; Harneit-Sievers et al., Chinese and African 
Perspectives on China in Africa; Dent, China and Africa Development Relations; 
Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation; and Shinn and Eisenman, 
 China and Africa. 
 4 A third possible answer to the question is that the novel could be set in the 
1980s, a decade or so before China’s dramatic economic rise and consequent 
interest in Africa’s resources. Gikandi, for example, states that some readers will 
recognize the novel’s setting as at least based on “1980s Kenya,” taking Daniel 
Arap Moi as the most obvious corollary of the Ruler (158). However, in the same 
sentence, Gikandi states that the country is “unnamed,” and Ngũgĩ gives it the 
fictional moniker “Aburĩria.” Furthermore, although there are few references to 
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the exact temporal setting in the novel, the narrator does tell us that “this was 
no longer the twentieth century” (584). To assume that Ngũgĩ is simply writing 
about Kenya obscures the effect of the fictionalized state, which requires us to 
look beyond Kenya’s boundaries to see the problems of corpolonialism in other 
parts of Africa. Even if the novel had been set in the 1980s, its setting would 
not prevent it from commenting on contemporary conditions, including those 
created by China’s post-1980s movement into Africa. Indeed, in many of his 
earlier works, particularly in his orature-infused texts such as The Trial of Dedan 
Kimathi (1976) and the unpublished musical “Mother, Sing for Me” (1982), 
Ngũgĩ uses historical settings and events not simply to illustrate lessons that 
the present can learn from the past but to challenge the hierarchical linearity of 
progressive time. There is a recurring effort in his work to treat past revolution-
ary events and “traditions” in Benjaminian terms as “charged with the time of 
the now” (Benjamin 261). On the topic of narrative and time in Wizard, see 
Colson’s excellent essay, “Arresting Time.”
 5 For example, in “Help Not Wanted,” a 2007 Op-Ed for the New York Times, 
Naím expresses a view characteristic of those who see China in Africa in negative 
terms. China’s assistance, he writes, is “rogue aid. It is development assistance 
that is nondemocratic in origin and nontransparent in practice, and its effect is 
typically to stifle real progress while hurting ordinary citizens.”
 6 Many Chinese and African diplomats have offered and continue to offer glowing 
characterizations of Chinese-African relations, and a 2008 Gallup poll indicates 
that in “sub-Saharan Africa, approval of China’s leadership is nearly three times 
as high” as it is in Europe and the Americas (Ray). Additionally, a number of 
important scholars also acknowledge that China’s presence in Africa is not nec-
essarily a threat, as has often been suggested in Western media. Broadman, for 
example, demonstrates that “there are beneficial complementarities arising in 
commerce between African countries and China” (102). In response to the ques-
tion, “Is China a rogue donor?” Brautigam answers, “I don’t think so. China’s 
rise in Africa is cause for some concern, but it need not evoke the level of fear 
and alarm raised by some who have condemned China’s aid and engagement as 
destabilizing, bad for governance, and unlikely to help Africa to end poverty” 
(307). She counters many of the myths about China in Africa and asserts that 
China’s success in raising its own people out of poverty may make them better 
partners for Africa than the West. 
 7 Following Williams (“Technê-Zen” 2011), I recognize that the terms “East” and 
“West” signify discursive and ideological constructions rather than cultural or 
political essences, and my use of the terms should be read with this recognition 
in mind. Additionally, I use the terms “East” and “Asia” interchangeably in part 
because the broad inclusiveness of the terms fits with the broadly inclusive na-
ture of Ngũgĩ ’s engagements with Eastern/Asian ideas and cultures in the novels, 
though primarily those of India and China.
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 8 For example, in a brief paper titled “China’s and India’s Investment Strategies 
in Africa,” Hong and Luyao note that “[c]ompared with China’s wide OFDI 
(outward foreign direct investment) distribution in Africa, 70% of India’s OFDI 
flows to Mauritius due to the large numbers of Indian immigrants there, taking 
advantage of the same language and similar cultural background” (i). 
 9 See Desai, “Oceans Connect”; Hofmeyr, “Universalizing the Indian Ocean”; and 
Jones, “The First South Asian East African Novel.”
 10 Mankel’s crime novel The Man from Beijing deserves mention here. First pub-
lished in Swedish in 2007 and translated into English in 2010, the novel’s plot 
is built at one point around China’s interests in Africa and includes a lengthy 
speech by a Chinese academic to a group of government officials about the need 
to turn to Africa for resources. Though Swedish, Mankel has spent a significant 
amount of time in Africa—he now lives half of each year in Mozambique, where 
he has no doubt seen China’s presence firsthand. My thanks to Kristin Matthews 
for bringing Mankel’s novel to my attention. 
 11 I am quoting here and throughout from Williams’ essay “The Technê Whim.” 
See also his essays “The Chinese Parrot” and “Technê-Zen” and his book The 
Buddha in the Machine: Art, Technology, and The Meeting of East and West (2014).
 12 In several of Ngũgĩ ’s essays over the years, in fact, he mentions China as one 
among several nations whose revolutions were instrumental in the twentieth 
century in bringing an end to colonialism. In Writers in Politics (1981), for ex-
ample, Ngũgĩ locates the Mau Mau struggle in Kenya alongside other revolu-
tionary movements throughout the world in the 1940s and 1950s, including 
“the Chinese revolution in 1949” (100). In the same book, the two chapters 
entitled “Afric-Asian Writers: The Links that Bind Us” and “Africa and Asia: The 
History that Refuses to be Silenced” address many of the historical connections 
between Africa and certain parts of Asia, including India, Korea, and China. 
And in Moving the Center (1993), Ngũgĩ writes about the successful revolutions 
in Cuba, Vietnam, and China as evidence of the “struggle of the living labour of 
the majority against the dead capital of a parasitic few” (111).
 13 Prestige projects are part of the two-pronged strategy of symbolic diplomacy 
that Chinese leaders have practiced in building relations with Africa. The other 
prong has to do with history, or the discursive strategy of using history to make 
partnerships between China and Africa seem natural and necessary. In Sudan, 
for example—not coincidentally where the US and other Western actors have 
been most critical of China’s activities—Chinese leaders 
  [pepper their] bilateral diplomatic events and official communiqués with 
references to General Charles “Chinese” Gordon, who helped suppress 
the Taiping rebellion in the 1860s, and upon being transferred to the 
Sudan, was put under siege and killed by the forces of the Mahdi in 1885. 
The Chinese claim that this event, which “finally punished” the imperial-
ist, brings the two states closer together. (Alden 17–18) 
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  Although referring to shared historical experiences of an explicitly political na-
ture would seem somewhat antithetical to China’s policy of political neutrality 
and non-interference, such “diplomatic” uses of history serve multiple purposes. 
In this case, Gordon becomes a sort of stand-in for the West as a whole, a con-
crete example of the West’s colonial legacy in the global south and, therefore, a 
simultaneous demonstration of the weak basis for cooperation with the West 
and the much stronger basis for cooperation with the East. Furthermore, the 
use of Gordon’s story constructs Sudan as fulfilling China’s need for justice: he 
harmed us, and you punished him. By implication, this narrative allows China 
to approach Sudan and other African nations in the spirit of reciprocity: you 
saved us before, now let us save you (from economic decline, Western hegemony, 
etc.). Gordon is, of course, just one of several examples of historical connections 
between China and Africa that are used to demonstrate solidarity and provide 
the basis for present and future cooperation.
 14 See the FOCAC’s 2010 report, “China-Africa Trading Volume Expected to Ex-
ceed US$100 Billion.”
 15 One other character in the novel, Titus Tajirika, experiences a similar “malady 
of words” that, like the Ruler’s, is caused by concerns about his race (349). By 
having the characters’ tongues stall on the word “if,” not only does Ngũgĩ draw 
attention to another aspect of conditionality and to the tension between fantasy 
and reality, he may also allude ironically to the poem “If—” by Kipling, whose 
poem “The White Man’s Burden” provides an infamous expression of the racist 
Western perspective that contributes to the Ruler’s and Titus’s illnesses. Addi-
tionally, the hyper-masculine message of “If—” forms an interesting contrast to 
the Global Bank’s infantilization of the Ruler: IF he had been white, then the 
Bank representatives would have treated him like a man and not a child. 
 16 It is not a requirement, of course, that every critic account for the title of the 
novel, but it is curious how few readings of the novel devote significant atten-
tion to the titular “hero” and focus instead on the Ruler and related neocolonial 
themes and formal issues as discussed above. These are important topics, but the 
tendency to over-emphasize the centrality of the dictator (which is what every 
dictator wants—all of the attention) begs the question: Why is the novel not 
titled The Ruler, in the same way, for example, Foden’s novel about Idi Amin is 
titled The Last King of Scotland (1998), Soyinka’s satirical dictator play is titled A 
Play of Giants (1984), and numerous Latin American dictator novels are named 
after their central antagonists (e.g., El Señor Presidente [1946] by Asturias; I, 
the Supreme [1974] by Roa Bastos; and, among others, The Autumn of the Pa-
triarch [1975] and The General in His Labyrinth [1989] by Márquez)? The title 
of Ngũgĩ ’s novel suggests that it is not, or at least not only, a dictator novel and 
that the Wizard’s storyline is perhaps more important, in the end, than that of 
the Ruler. Gikandi notes that the novel’s title references a legendary wizard in 
Gĩkũyũ folklore and, in fact, comes from “a composite of traditional stories fea-
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turing the Wizard of the Crow as a character” (161). However, because Kamĩtĩ 
is not the original Wizard of the Crow but simply appropriates the name, almost 
by accident, understanding the folkloric origins of his name does not entirely 
explain why Ngũgĩ chose to title the novel after this particular character. 
 17 In addition to Alden, see, for example, Naím, Shinn, and the variety of positions 
explored in Chinese and African Perspectives, ed. by Harneit-Sievers et al.
 18 These antics also recall the phenomenon of “medical tourism,” which is “where 
patients travel overseas for operations and various invasive therapies” (Connell 
x). Connell notes that medical tourism “has grown rapidly since the late 1990s, 
especially for cosmetic surgery” (x).
 19 Readers familiar with Achebe’s Things Fall Apart will recognize this reference to 
“chi” as the “personal god that helps to determine the fortune of each individual” 
in Igbo society (Booker 52).
 20 As I note at the beginning of this essay, my aim of reading Wizard in the context 
of China’s specific policies and activities in Africa does not depend upon the text 
only referencing China. However, it is interesting to note that although Bud-
dhism originated in India, the nation with the largest Buddhist population today 
is China. (See the Pew Forum’s report on the “Global Religious Landscape” in 
2010.) A contemporary Gautama, therefore, should refer us to China as clearly 
as it does to India. Additionally, on the topic of China, Africa, and space travel, 
it is interesting to note former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo’s remarks 
to Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2006: “The twenty-first century is the century 
for China to lead the world. And when you are leading the world, we want to be 
close behind you. When you are going to the moon, we don’t want to be left behind” 
(qtd. in Michel and Beuret 11; emphasis added). 
 21 Mirrors, of course, have been associated with magic and mystical powers 
throughout history and in various cultures (“mirror, mirror on the wall. . .”), but 
it is interesting to note a recent scientific utilization of mirrors in healing prob-
lems of the mind. The innovative neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran—whom 
Time magazine once named one of the one hundred most influential people in 
the world—famously discovered a way to cure amputees of pain in their “phan-
tom limbs” by using a mirror to create the illusion that the patient’s missing limb 
is still intact. Ramachandran has published widely on this technique, which he 
calls “Mirror Visual Feedback,” or MVF (see, for example, Ramachandran’s “Use 
of Visual Feedback” and Colapinto’s “Brain Games”). Whether or not Ngũgĩ 
knew about these experiments with MVF, which were introduced in the 1990s, 
Ramachandran’s aestheticized low-tech approach to treating “brain function” 
bears a fascinating similarity to the Wizard’s divination techniques, which he 
considers to be more science and art than magic.
 22 In addition to the Eightfold Path, the Buddha discusses “seven factors of Awak-
ening” in the Pali canon, which may be what the “Seven Herbs” are patterned af-
ter (“Himavanta”). However, seven is also the Ruler’s “sacred number” which he 
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invests with mystical significance (Ngũgĩ 12). Thus, I believe Ngũgĩ has Kamĩtĩ 
and Nyawĩra list seven in order partly to re-appropriate and thereby undermine 
one aspect of the Ruler’s discourse of power.
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